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Abstract
This paper models the optimal distribution of government spend-
ing when the electoral benefit does not accrue to the party in power
but to the incumbent of the district which received the spending. The
model shows that, under certain parametres, more money is spent in
core support districts. To verify this claim empirically, I first study
the distribution of projects undertaken in the scope of the 2009-2011
Canada Economic Action Plan, and find that districts supporting
the party in power received more projects than opposition districts
controlling for socio-economic characteristics of electoral districts and
those of its representative in Parliament. Second, taking into account
the missing variable bias, I provide evidence for the fact that govern-
ment spending played a positive role in the reelection of the district
incumbent party in the 2011 elections.
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1 Introduction
All models explaining the distribution of discretionary government spending
start with the premiss that the party in power can take credit for spending in
the constituency and conclude either that core districts (Cox and McCubbins,
1986) or swing districts (Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987) are favoured. Contrary
to this previous literature, the model developped in this paper explains gov-
ernment spending assuming that credit is given only to the incumbent of the
district where the funds were spent. This electoral benefit to the incumbent
could come from two channels. First, district representatives could actively
contribute to the allocation of spending. They could, for example, lobby key
civil servants or help project proponents through the red tape. In that sense,
credit from their constituents would be duly earned. Second, one could posit
that most voters know little about the allocation process. Such voters could
over-estimate the role played by their representative, and give them unduly
credit. Litschig and Morrison (2011) show, for example, that regional in-
cumbents have a greater probability of reelection when their district receives
more transfers from the central government. These incumbents receive the
electoral benefit even though they played no role in determining the transfer.
It is unclear which of the two channels is the stronger one, but it is realis-
tic to assume that the incumbent receives some electoral benefit from the
spending. Using this assumption, I find parametres under which the party in
power would favour core or swing districts. To test the assumptions and the
predictions of this model, I use the distribution of projects undertaken in the
scope of the Canada Economic Action Plan 2009-2011: $42 billion invested
in 15 000 infrastructure projects across Canada.
In the last 20 years, much empirical research has tested whether core or
swing districts benefit from the allocation of pork barrel. Levitt & Snyder
(1995), for example, find that Democratic control of Congress led to more
intergovernmental transfers to democratic districts between 1984 and 1990,
and Ansolabehere & Snyder (2006) come to the same conclusion. Denemark
(2000), however, shows that the allocation of recreational projects in Aus-
tralia was biased towards swing districts, just like Swedish ecological projects
(Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002). This paper finds support for the core dis-
trict hypothesis: the most money went towards districts strongly supporting
the party in power, less money was invested in swing districts, and the least
money was given to opposition districts.
In spite of the fact that the theoretical literature uses reelection as the
motivation for pork barrel spending, there is surprisingly very little empirical
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research connecting spending with subsequent election results. Both Alvarez
& Saving (1997) and Samuels (2002) attempt this analysis. However, by not
taking into account a possible missing variable bias affecting both spending
and reelection, their results offer little guidance. Snyder & Levitt (1997)
study the impact ofgovernment spending on the share of votes for the party
in power in the district using valid instruments and find a positive correla-
tion between spending and the share of votes. Finally, Litschig and Morrison
(2011) use a regression discontinuity design to study whether the transfer
from the central government have an impact on the reelection of the incum-
bent in the regional government. This paper also analyzes the impact of
spending on the reelection of the district incumbent but using instrumental
variable strategy. To address the issue of the missing variable bias, I use a
dummy variable indicating whether the district was in the downtown of a
major city as instrument. Using this strategy, I find that district incumbents
receive electoral benefits for the projects undertaken in their district. This
evidence supports the key assumption of the model.
This paper is the first to build a model explaining the optimal distribu-
tion of discretionary government spending by the party in power assuming
that only the district incumbent receives the electoral benefit. Furthermore,
it also contributes to a burgeoning empirical literature linking government
spending to the electoral success of the incumbent. The rest of the paper is
divided into the following sections. First, I build a model. I, then, describe
the data and estimation strategy. Third, I present and discuss the results
of the regression analysis. Finally, I conclude and present further research
avenues.
2 Model
The party in power allocates spending to maximize its electoral sucess. In
Lindbeck & Weibull (1987), such a strategy means investing heavily in dis-
tricts without a strong political allegiance (ie swing districts) to sway the
vote towards the party in power. However, when the electoral benefit goes
only to the incumbent and the completion of projects is random, investments
in such districts are very risky. These districts are very responsive to gov-
ernment spending, but they could easily change hands before the project is
actually started. In such a case, an incumbent from the opposition party
would benefit from the spending. Investing in such districts has the poten-
tial for a great return, but also a great loss. The trade-off between risk and
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return is at the heart of the model.
Before studying further the behaviour of parties, let’s first consider the
behaviour of voters. They have a utility function over political platform (ppl)
and money spent in their district (Bk). I assume that:
∂Ulk
∂Bk
> 0 and that Bk
is the same for all voters of district “k”. Citizens will vote for the district in-
cumbent if their utility is greater than a certain threshold: ulk(ppl, Bk) > Ulk.
The party in power cannot modify its political platform to sway the vote.
It can only allocate funds to the electoral districts in T0 to maximize the
probability of its candidate to win the election. Each district receives one
project, which is completed at a random date. This randomness could be
attributed to unforeseen problems or exogenous decisions taken by civil ser-
vants mandated to complete the projects. Credit for the project accrues only
to the district incumbent and only to the district incumbent in place when
the project is completed. Following the allocation decision, there are two
elections. The first one can take place before (with probability pi) or after
the completion of the project (with probability 1 − pi) in a given district.
The second one takes place after the completion of the projects. Figure 1
illustrates the timeline.
(Figure 1)
The party in power maximizes the probability that the district elects its
candidate in the first (E1k) and second elections (E
2
k) by allocating pork Bk to
district “k”. The more money a district receives, the greater is the probability
that the district reelects the incumbent but at a decreasing rate (∂Ek
∂Bk
> 0
and ∂
2Ek
∂B2k
< 0). The total value of projects must satisfy the exogenous budget
condition (B):
maxBk E
1
k + E
2
k (1)
subject to:
k=n∑
k=1
Bk = B (2)
The marginal impact of one dollar of spending in a given district is there-
fore:
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pi
∂E1k
∂Bk
|k + (1− pi)E
[
∂E2k
∂Bk
|k
]
(3)
The first expression is the impact of the spending on the probability of
winning the first election for the party in power if the project takes place be-
fore the first election. This impact will depend on the status of the district.
If the incumbent is from the party in power, for example, the expression
will be positive. Otherwise, it will be negative. Furthermore, the absolute
magnitude of the impact will also depend on the district. If, for example, the
party in power won the district by a large margin in the previous election,
and is very confident to win again, the impact of spending will be positive
but small. The second expression represents the expected impact of the pork
on the second election if the project is completed after the first election. This
impact will depend on the district and on the result of the first election. A
district in the hands of the party in power before the first election could
now be in the hands of the opposition for example. To simplify the model, I
abstract from the impact of winning the first election on winning the second
election in line with the well-documented incumbency effect (Lee, 2001).
To maximize the return of spending, the party in power will want to
equalize its marginal impact across districts. If spending has a great impact
in a district, it will receive more money until its decreasing marginal contri-
bution equates the marginal benefit across districts.
The literature generally distinguishes between two types of districts: core
and swing districts. Core districts have an established political allegiance,
while swing districts are more easily influenced. Because the electoral effect
accrues to the incumbent, it is necessary to be more specific about the types
to capture who is incumbent. This model divides the districts into four
types: core opposition (co), swing opposition (so), swing party in power (spp)
and core party in power (cpp). I can now compare the marginal impact of
spending in these four types of districts and infer the amount of spending in
each type. Equation (3) can now be written explicitely to account for these
four types. To do so, I introduce P i→j which is the probability of transitioning
from type ”i” to type ”j” during the first election. The marginal impact of
spending in district ”i” is therefore:
pi
∂E1i
∂Bi
|i + (1− pi)
(
P i→coi ·
∂E2i
∂Bi
|co + P i→so∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|so + P i→spp∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp + P i→cpp∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
)
(4)
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The objective of the next section is to establish conditions under which
the different types of districts will receive more or less spending. Before
establishing these conditions, it is necessary to differentiate swing and core
districts using the following six assumptions:
Assumption 1(symmetry 1): P a→b = P b→a where ”a” and ”b” are
types of districts.
The probabilities are symmetric. This assumption means that a district
has the same probability to go, for example, from an opposition swing dis-
trict to a party in power swing district as the one to go from a party in power
swing district to an opposition swing district. This assumption is unrealistic
if one party is gaining in popularity.
Assumption 2 (symmetry 2): ∂Ei
∂Bi
|co = −∂Ei∂Bi |cpp and ∂Ei∂Bi |so = −∂Ei∂Bi |spp
The absolute value of the marginal impact of both core districts and both
swing districts are equal.
Assumption 3 (similarity):
∂E1i
∂Bi
|k = ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|k
For a given type of district, the impact of pork is the same in the first
and second elections:
Assumption 4 (proximity): P so→co > P so→cpp and P spp→cpp > P spp→co.
It is more probable for a swing opposition district to become a core oppo-
sition district for the second election than to become a core party in power
district. Similarly, it is more probable for a swing party in power district
to become a core party in power district than to become an core opposition
district.
Assumption 5 (inertia): P cpp→cpp > P spp→spp and P co→co > P so→so
The probability that a core district keeps the same type is greater than
the probability that a swing district keeps the same type.
Assumption 6 (responsiveness): ∂Ei
∂Bi
|spp > ∂Ei∂Bi |cpp
Spending has a greater impact in swing districts than in core districts.
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Assumption 2 already allows a simplification from equation (4) to com-
pare the marginal impact of spending in different types of districts. Spending
has a greater marginal impact in district of type ”k” than district of type ”l”
and will therefore receive more pork if:
pi
(
∂E1i
∂Bi
|k − ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|l
)
+ (1− pi) (P l→co + P k→cpp − (P k→co + P l→cpp)) ∂E2i
∂Bi
|cpp
+(1− pi) (P l→so + P k→spp − (P k→so + P l→spp)) ∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp > 0 (5)
Using the previous assumptions, it is now possible to prove the first propo-
sition:
Proposition 1: If pi is small enough, spending in core party in power
districts (k=cpp) will have a greater marginal impact than in swing party in
power districts (l=spp). A maximizing party would therefore spend more in
core party in power districts.
Proof: Using the fact that
∂E1i
∂Bi
|k is now ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|cpp and assumption 3, I can
distribute the first term in the second and third terms:
((1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
+ ((1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp))− pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp > 0 (6)
((1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp >
(pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp))) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp (7)
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that:2
(pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp))) > 0. (8)
It is therefore possible to express the ratio of the probabilities as an upper
bound for the ratio of the marginal impacts of spending on the result of one
election for the two types of districts:
2if the term is negative, the ratio of the two partial derivatives is no longer bounded,
which would also prove the proposition
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(1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi
pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp)) >
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2i
∂Bi
|cpp
(9)
From assumption 6, we know that:
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
> 1, which means that at
least:
(1− pi) (P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)) + pi
pi − (1− pi) (P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp)) > 1 (10)
P spp→co + P cpp→cpp − (P cpp→co + P spp→cpp)
+P spp→so + P cpp→spp − (P cpp→so + P spp→spp) > 0 (11)
The left hand side can be regrouped as a sum of four terms:
(P spp→co − P cpp→co) + (P spp→so − P cpp→so)
+(P cpp→cpp − P spp→spp) + (P cpp→spp − P spp→cpp) > 0 (12)
Due to assumption 4, the first and second assumptions are positive. As-
sumption 6 makes the third term positive, and assumption 1 makes the last
term equal 0. In that sense, the expression is necessarily positive, and could
therefore be greater than 1
1−pi if pi is small enough. QED
The intuition for this result is that the risk that the party-in-power in-
advertently helps the incumbent in a swing opposition district is greater in
swing party in power districts than in core party in power districts. This risk
increases as pi becomes smaller. In an extreme case where pi = 1, there is
a probability zero that spending in a swing party in power district will help
an opposition incumbent. In such a case, more spending would go towards
swing party in power districts.
Proposition 2: If pi is small enough, the marginal benefit of pork in
swing opposition district is greater than it is in core opposition districts.
Proof:
pi
(
∂E1i
∂Bi
|so − ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|co
)
+ (1− pi) (P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
+(1− pi) (P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp > 0(13)
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Using assumptions 2 and 3, we can substitute
∂E1i
∂Bi
|so− ∂E
1
i
∂Bi
|co by ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp−
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp and rearrange to get:
((1− pi)(P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|cpp >
(−(1− pi)(P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) + pi) ∂E
2
i
∂Bi
|spp (14)
which can be rewritten as:
((1− pi)(P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) + pi)
(−(1− pi)(P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) + pi) >
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2i
∂Bi
|cpp
(15)
Since
∂E2i
∂Bi
|spp
∂E2
i
∂Bi
|cpp
> 1, the left-hand side expression must also be strictly
greater than zero for this condition to be met:
((1− pi)(P co→co + P so→cpp − (P so→co + P co→cpp)) + pi)
(−(1− pi)(P co→so + P so→spp − (P so→so + P co→spp)) + pi) > 1(16)
P co→co + P so→cpp − P so→co − P co→cpp + P co→so + P so→spp − P so→so − P co→spp > 0(17)
P co→co + P so→cpp − P so→co − P co→cpp + P co→so + P so→spp − P so→so − P co→spp)) > 0(18)
(P co→co − P so→so) + (P so→cpp − P co→cpp) + (P co→so − P so→co) + (P so→cpp − P co→cpp) > 0(19)
From assumption 6, the first term is positive. From assumption 4, the
second and fourth term are positive. From assumption 1, the third term is
zero. The whole expression is therefore positive, and the inegality (15) is
possible. QED
If pi is small enough, the distribution of spending corresponds to the
predictions of the core district hypothesis: Bco ≤ Bso and Bspp ≤ Bcpp. If
pi is large, the distribution resembles the predictions of the swing district
hypothesis, only that Bco = Bso = 0. In the extreme case where pi = 1,
any pork going to opposition districts would necessarily hurt the candidate
from the party in power. There would therefore be no spending in opposition
districts.
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2.1 Numerical Example
The last two propositions establish that it is possible for core party in power
districts to receive more pork than swing party in power districts if pi is small
enough. Using a transition matrix which meets the previous assumptions (see
table 1), I find how small pi has to be for plausible parametres to lead to this
conclusion. Taking those transition probabilities and using equation (9), I
build table 2 which shows the upper bound for
∂E
∂B
|spp
∂E
∂B
|cpp which supports an
allocation to core districts. It would be plausible for
∂E
∂B
|spp
∂E
∂B
|cpp to be at or above
1.6, which would mean that if pi < 0.4, one would expect core districts to
receive more projects.
(Table 2 here)
(Table 3 here)
3 Data and Estimation Strategy
3.1 Data
Before discussing in detail the methodology used to verify the model, it is
important to describe the Economic Action Plan (EAP) in more detail. This
plan is a very general term used to frame government budgets following the
2008 financial crisis. The purpose of these budgets was to stimulate the
Canadian economy through increased government spending. This paper fo-
cuses on the infrastructure projects introduced in the EAP. The provision for
these projects existed only in the 2009 and 2010 budgets, and they should
have been completed by the end of 2011. About 15 000 such projects were fi-
nanced through the EAP for a total value of $42 billion. Examples of projects
include: road resurfacing, sewage water plant improvements, social housing
renovations, improvements to arenas, purchase of new equipment for busi-
nesses, renovations to federal buildings etc.
The first step in the allocation procedure was to create and endow ap-
proximately 30 iniatives which address certain infrastructure needs. Exam-
ples of initiatives include: housing for low-income seniors, northern housing,
cleaning-up contaminated sites, knowledge infrastructure program, national
historic sites of Canada etc. These initiatives were then given to departments
according to their specialties.
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The second step was to choose the specific projects to be funded. An
important criteria for the approval of all projects was “shovel-readiness”,
meaning that projects could start once the funds had been approved. All de-
partments were responsible to establishing further criteria and allocating the
funds. In some cases, money was given to provinces who chose the projects,
while in other ones, municipalities or NGOs applied directly for federal fund-
ing. In most cases, the federal government only funded a percentage of the
total cost of the project. On average, the federal government covered 40 per-
cent of the cost. Due to the application and cost-sharing mechanisms, the
amount invested in an electoral district is not completely determined by the
federal government.
Finally, once a project was approved, this information was publicized on
the website of the EAP 3 and a large poster was erected on the site of the
project. These posters (see figure X for an example) stated the purpose of
the project, the fact that it was funded through the EAP and a maple leaf
to signal that the funding was from the federal government. These measures
provided much publicity to these projects and for the EAP in general.
In May 2011, when all probjects had been approved and publicized, I
started collecting data on the EAP. I first summed the federal/total amount
spent and the number of projects undertaken in each of the 308 electoral
districts. Second, I gathered information on party allegiance across districts.
Parties presented candidates in each electoral district for the 2008 election,
and the candidate who received the most votes in the district was chosen as
Member of Parliament (MP) for that district. These elections preceded the
EAP and brought the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) to Parliament
as a minority government with 142 MPs. For every district, I gathered in-
formation on the share of the votes for each of the four main parties and
on the party of the winning candidate. The 2011 election followed the dis-
tribution and completion of projects. To determine the impact of spending
on reelection, I collected information on the reelection of incumbent parties
by district and the share of the vote of the 2008 incumbent. Third, I incor-
porate information on the MP representating the district between 2008 and
2011 (39th legislature). The experience and the previous positions MP could
play a role in the distribution of projects, and could possibly play a role in
the reelection of the MP.
3http://actionplan.gc.ca/eng/map.asp and http://www.spatialdatabox.com/map-
demos/canada-economic-action-plan-map.html
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Finally, I used per district data from the 2006 census to control for socio-
economic differences between districts. This data includes the population of
the district 4, the share of the population aged 19 and below, the share of the
population aged 65 and above, the median income of a family, the share of
the immigrant population, the share of the aboriginal population, the unem-
ployment rate, whether the district was downtown, whether the district was
in the North, and whether the district was in the National Capital Region.
These explanatory variables should capture some of the needs of districts for
infrastructure.
Using this unique dataset, I can verify the model presented in the pre-
vious section. First, I study the allocation of projects by electoral district
to determine if swing or core districts were favoured. Second, to provide an
empirical basis for the key assumption of the model I estimate whether the
number and total value of projects had a positive impact on the incumbent’s
reelection in 2011 and the change of his/her vote share between the 2008 and
2011 elections.
3.2 Impact of Political Allegiance on the Distribution
of Projects: Core or Swing?
The model predicts an allocation to core or swing districts depending on the
value of pi, the probability that the projects are completed before the first
election. As much as it is impossible to know the value of pi, it is important
to know that the party in power in 2009 formed a minority government that
could have been defeated at any time. If such an event had happened, new
elections would have been called. It is therefore reasonable to assume that pi
would be small, which would speak for an allocation to core districts.
In the theory section, core and swing districts were distinguished through
their responsiveness (∂Ei
∂Bi
) and transition probabilities. Neither of these
parametres is observable. Generally, in the empirical literature, the share
of votes is used as an approximation for swing or core district (see for exam-
ple Snyder and Levitt, 1995). Since Canada has three major parties (four in
Quebec), the variable used to distinguish between the two types of district
is the difference between the share of the votes for the party in power (CPC)
4All districts have a population of approximately 100 000, except districts in Prince-
Edward-Island and in the three territories: Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut
that have an approximate population of 30 000 each
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and the best opposition party. For simplicity purposes, table 3 uses a cut-off
of 10 percent to separate core and swing districts. Districts where the CPC
won by more than 15 percent are core party in power districts, and when they
won by less than 15 percent, the districts are swing party in power districts.
The same cut-off is used for opposition districts.
These univariate results indicate that core party in power districts had
more projects than all other types of districts. When considering the value
of projects, however, there is no difference across the types of districts. Since
swing districts (party in power or opposition) did not receive more projects
or money, these preliminary results would speak for the core district hypoth-
esis. It could however be the case that certain socio-economic groups tended
to vote CPC and that these groups needed more investment in infrastruc-
ture. Table 4 explores this possibility. Not surprisingly, the socio-economic
chracteristics of a district are correlated with the party representing it. For
example, constituents of CPC districts have higher income, a lower unem-
ployment rate and a higher participation rate. Since CPC districts seem to
be richer on average, the positive bias towards CPC district will probably be
accentuated when socio-economic variables are included in the multivariate
regression.
(Table 3 here)
(Table 4 here)
The first regression models the amount of money spent by the federal
government. This amount is used and not the total amount, because the
federal government did not control the total value of the project, but only
the amount it invested. One problem with the value of projects is its lack
of robustness. Every project is indicated at a single location on the map
of the EAP, but certain large projects (highways or bridges, for example)
could be taking place across many districts. Furthermore, there could be a
mistake in the location of projects on the map used to create the dataset.
If all projects were of the same magnitude, these two problems would prob-
ably even themselves out. The EAP, however, contains a large spectrum of
projects of different sizes. It is therefore also useful to model the number of
projects in a district as well, because the number of projects is not as much
affected by large projects or mistakes. It can therefore serve as a robust-
ness check. I explain these two dependent variables with the socio-economic
characteristics of the district, the characteristics of the MP representing the
district, and the results of the 2008 election:
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federal amount = β12008 Election + β2 MP + β3 socioeconomic +  (20)
The coefficients of interest are those related to 2008 elections. If the core
district hypothesis is true, one would expect a positive coefficient for districts
that elected a CPC candidate in 2008. Furthermore, if the model elaborated
previously and the one from Cox & McCubbins (1986) are correct, one would
predict a positive coefficient for the difference between the CPC candidate
and the best opposition candidate as illustrated by figure 2. This difference
is small and postive when a CPC candidate is elected by a small margin and
is large and negative when an opposition candidate is elected with a large
margin. Conversely, if the swing district hypothesis is correct, I expect a sig-
nificant negative coefficient on the absolute value of the difference between
the CPC candidate and the best opposition candidat. When this difference
is small, the district is considered a swing district (see figure 2).
(Figure 2)
Alvarez & Saving (1987b) and Smart & Milligan (2005) show that MP
characteristics play a major role in the distribution of pork barrel. More ex-
perienced and better connected MPs should be able to bring more money to
their district. More specifically, members of the Privy Council and more ex-
perienced MPs should bring more money to their district. The Privy Council
is not particularly well known among Canadians, but all its members are ac-
tual or former members of the cabinet. These politicians are or have been
important figures of government, and therefore know its inner-workings. It
is therefore realistic to assume that they have an advantage when seeking
projects for their constituents. As for experience, I include two dummies:
fewer than 5 years of experience as MP and more than 10 years of experience
as MP.
The purpose of the EAP is to support families and communities in need.
The socio-economic characteristics of districts should remove this effect and
show to which extent spending was directed towards these communities. The
unemployment rate should, for example, be positively correlated with the
value of projects, while the median income of the district should negatively
impact the resources going towards a given district. Independently of these
characteristics, some districts simply require more money. For example, dis-
tricts comprising the downtown area of a city have more and older infras-
tructure, and districts located in the North are in dire need for infrastructure.
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3.3 Estimation of the Electoral Impact of Projects
The second part of the empirical verification provides evidence for the fact
the key assumption of the model: government spending brings an electoral
benefit to the district incumbent. The objective is to study the impact of the
EAP projects on the reelection probability of the district incumbent party
using the total amount spent in the district, the 2008 election results, and
MP characteristics in a probit regression. The variable of interest is the total
amount of spending in a district. This variable is used instead of the amount
spent by the federal government, because it is easier for voters to assess the
total value of a project than to determine how much the federal government
invested. Actually, in light of the publicity done by the federal government,
it would not be surprising that voters give full credit to the federal govern-
ment for projects only partially funded by it. As in the previous model, the
number of projects in a district is also used, but the motivation is slightly
different. When voters travel through the district, the probability of them
seeing the poster of a project and being reminded of the EAP would depend
on the number of projects, not on the value of projects. By using both the
total value and the number of projects, I can compare the two coefficients.
A significant difference would indicate whether there is an electoral benefit
to undertake many low-scale projects or a few expensive projects. Finally,
to provide more robustness to the findings, I also run a regression explaining
the difference in the shares of votes between the 2011 and 2008 elections for
the party who won the 2008 elections. If, for example, the liberal party won
the district with 45 % of the vote in 2008 and 50% in 2011, the value of the
variable for this district is 5%. If government spending provides an electoral
benefit to the incumbent, more money should be correlated with an increase
in this difference.
As noted by Snyder & Levitt (1997), it would be inappropriate to simply
use the total amount (or the number of projects) in the regression, because
of a missing variable bias. Both the total value of projects in a district and
the probability of reelection are correlated with the perceived tightness of
the race and with the political skills of the incubment. In the latter case,
incumbents with superior political skills will have the connections to direct
money towards their districts, and these skills will also serve them to secure
reelection. Since neither the perceived tightness of the race nor the political
skills can be observed and included in a regression, instrumental variables are
needed to remove the correlation between explanatory variables and the error
term. Such variables should be correlated with the total value of projects,
but uncorrelated with the probability of reelection. The instrument chosen is
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whether the district comprises the downtown of a major city. Downtown dis-
tricts have more and older infrastructure. They therefore need more money.
However, there is no reason to believe that constituents in downtown dis-
tricts have a greater or lower tendency to reelect the incumbent party. The
equations estimated are therefore:
To verify this claim, I compare downtown districts with non-downtown
districts in table 5. Two differences stand out: there are fewer children and
more immigrants in downtown districts. Since immigrants probably have not
had time to choose a favourite party, their vote could be more volatile. Sim-
ilarly, downtowns probably have a greater fluctuation of people thus leading
to a greater fluctuation in party allegiance. Both factors would speak for a
negative relationship between the reelection of the district incumbent party
and downtown districts. If this were the case, it would mean that the num-
ber of projects in a district would have a negative impact on incumbency
since there were more projects in downtown districts. Since the opposite is
found (see table 8), the number of immigrants and the transient nature of
downtowns do not jeopardize the validity of the instruments.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that downtown districts have had a
higher probability of reelecting the incumbent in previous elections. The
probability of an incumbent party to be reelected in the 2004, 2006 and 2008
elections was 86.7 percent in downtown districts and was 83.6 percent in non-
downtown districts. This difference is not significant. If I include regional
dummies (East, Quebec, Ontario and West) and time dummies in a probit
regression, the variable downtown is still not significant.
(Table 5 here)
The 2004 election is particularly interesting, because it followed a reces-
sion (2001-2002) as did the 2011 election. During the 2004 election, 80 per-
cent of downtown incumbents were reelected and 83 percent of non-downtown
incumbents were reelected. There was no major spending program following
the 2001 recession. There was also no special measure in the 2003 or 2004
budgets 5 which could have favoured downtown locations. Budget 2003 in-
creased spending for municipal infrastructure by $ 3 billion over ten years,
and budget 2004 alloted $1 billion for the municipal rural infrastructure fund
(Canadian Department of Finance, 2011). In comparison to the $ 42 billion
plan over two years, these two initiatives are very small, and the biggest
5There was no budget in 2002 as the 2001 budget was in December.
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from the two, the municipal rural infrastructure fund clearly went to rural
districts. There was therefore no increase in spending in downtown districts
preceding the 2004 election. Had there been such a program and a similar
incumbent reelection probability, it would mean that spending does not nec-
essarily affect the reelection of incumbents. All in all, downtown districts
have not been more prone to reelect incumbents, especially not in elections
following economic downturns.
The last check to insure the validity of the instrument is to examine
who were the incumbents in downtown districts in the 2011 election. It
could be that parties put special candidates into downtown districts, because
these districts might have more visibility. Table 6 presents the previous
employment of downtown incumbents for the 2008 elections. The only one
who is member of the privy council is Bob Rae. Olivia Chow and Marc
Garneau are the two other ones who would be known across Canada. The
incumbents in downtown districts do not stand out as being different from
other members of Parliament.
(Table 6 here)
Since the downtown variable is also able to withhold these tests, it is a
valid instrument, and I can estimate the following equations:
Reelected = β1Spending + β2Election Results + β3MP Char +  (21)
Spending = γ1Downtown + γ2Election Results + γ3MP Char + u (22)
Since a CPC government allocated the resources, theory would suggest
that I also test whether spending had an impact on the election of CPC can-
didates instead of testing only whether it had an impact on the reelection of
district incumbent. Unfortunately, the missing variable bias makes it difficult
to test the former model. It would be very difficult to find valid instruments
for a regression with the election of the CPC as dependent variable. Indeed,
any district characteristic related with the spending pattern would be corre-
lated with the party elected. Districts in the north, for example, could have
been brought towards the CPC in the 2011 elections due to their opposition
to the long gun registry. District characteristics not related with the election
of a CPC candidate would probably be only remotely related to the spending.
This situation would therefore lead to a weak instrument problem, and the
relatively small sample of 308 observations would make identification nearly
impossible.
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The second block of explanatory variables stems from the 2006 and 2008
elections. The first variable is the difference between the winning and runner-
up candidate independently of parties in the 2008 elections. When this dif-
ference is small, I expect the probability of defeat of the incumbent to be
high. The second variable consists of a dummy whether the district reelected
the same party in 2006 and 2008. A district that changed hands between
2006 and 2008 is volatile and will probably change hands again in 2011. The
last variable is whether the district elected a candidate from the CPC in 2008
and captures the gain of popularity of the CPC from 2008 to 2011.
The third block consists of MP characteristics. Certain MPs are better
known, which should help their reelection bid. I therefore include whether
the MP is a member of the Privy Council, and two dummies for experience.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Impact of Political Allegiance on the Distribution
of Projects
Table 7 presents the results of the regression explaining the federal amounts
spent by district. The first surprising result is the general lack of significance
of socio-economic variables. One of the pillars of the plan was to provide
support to communities and families, but there is no indication that money
was directed towards poorer districts in need of support. One possible expla-
nation is that census data from 2006 no longer reflected the relative poverty
of districts in 2009, possibly because the financial crisis hurt specific districts
independently of their initial situation. The plan could therefore still have
supported poorer communities and families, but the data used does not cap-
ture the specific impact of the financial crisis.
Contrary to findings from Smart & Milligan (2005), MP characteristics
played no role in the allocation of funds. This result supports the idea that
MPs play little role in policy development in Canada.
The coefficients for the political variables support the“core district hy-
pothesis, and corroborate the results of Smart & Milligan (2005). Further-
more, the results correspond exactly to the predictions from Cox & McCub-
bins (1986). In Table 7, model (5) shows that the increase in the difference
between the share of votes of the CPC candidate and the best opposition
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candidate leads to more spending. In other words, districts where the CPC
won by a great margin (support group) received a lot of money, districts
where it was a close race reaped less (swing districts), and, finally, districts
where the opposition party won by a great margin got the least. Unsurpris-
ingly, the CPC dummy is positive and gains significance when going from the
over-specified model (2) to the more parsimonious model (4) thus supporting
the core district hypothesis.
(Table 7 here)
Table 8 contains the coefficients when the number of projects per district
is the dependent variable. This robustness check confirms previous findings
concerning political variables. CPC districts did receive more projects, but
this coefficient loses its significance when the difference between the CPC
candidate and the best opposition candidate is included meaning that the
latter variable explains better the variations in the number of projects. For
every 1% increase in this difference, the district received 0.3 projects more.
This number might seem small but knowing that the average project repre-
sents almost $3 million, a small increase in the voting difference would have
a substantial impact on the community.
Interestingly, when considering the number of projects, more socio-economic
variables become significant. The unemployment rate and the share of se-
nior citizens, for example, become significant and positive. One reason for
this sudden change is that poverty reduction projects were smaller in scope
but greater in number. Indeed, the average project for the renovation and
retrofit of social housing was $107 924, while the average project from the
infrastructure stimulus fund was close to one million dollars.
(Table 8 here)
4.2 Impact of Projects on Reelection
Before considering the results of the probit regression explaining the reelec-
tion of incumbent parties, it is important to consider the significance of the
variable: downtown in explaining both the value of federal funding and the
number of projects. In both cases, the variable is highly significant, because
there is a need for investment in downtown cores. The “downtown dummy
explains by itself 27 percent of the variation in federal investment (F-value:
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112.2) and 7 percent in the variation in the number of projects (F-value:
23.3). In that sense, it captures enough of the variation to avoid the problem
of weak instruments, but it also does not capture too much of the endogenous
part of the variable.
Table 9 presents the results of the probit regressions explaining the reelec-
tion of the incumbent party of the district. These results must be taken with
caution, because the coefficients of instrumental variables are still biased in
finite sample in the presence of endogeneity, and it is dubious whether 308
observations are sufficient to assume asymptotic properties. Even though
the coefficients of the IV regression are about double the size of the probit
coefficients, the Wald test of exogeneity fails to reject exogeneity at the 5%
mark in both cases (it rejects at the 10% mark). The endogeneity problem
discussed in Levitt & Snyder (1997) might not be as much of a problem as
initially assumed, because the federal government does not fully control the
total amount of pork barrel going to a given district. The fact that other or-
ganisations contribute to the projects could reduce the missing variable bias,
because the decisions of these organisations do not depend on the missing
variable.
The most important result of table 8 is the significant and positive co-
efficient for both the number of projects and the total amount spent in a
district. This finding contradicts the ones from Samuels (2002), and clearly
shows that the incumbent party received credit for the value and the num-
ber of projects undertaken in the district as assumed in the model. Since it
would be interesting to see whether CPC MPs get more credit, I also ran the
regression explaining the number of projects with the interaction between
CPC and the number of projects. Since OLS estimates seem unbiased, this
regression was done with the setting of model 1. The coefficient of the inter-
action term was positive but not significant (result not reported), meaning
that CPC MPs did not benefit more than opposition MPs from the number
of projects spent in their district.
At first glance, it seems surprising that the incumbent party of a district
would get any credit for decisions taken by the party in power. However,
since voters are generally known to be poorly informed about policies and
politicians (Bartels, 1996), it is realistic to think that voters probably know
very little about the process leading to the allocation of projects. Voters
could therefore give credit to their MP for projects in their district. If voters
punish the incumbent for natural disasters (Cole, Healy and Werker, 2008),
they could equally well give credit to the incumbents for positive outcomes
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outside of his control as reported by Litschig and Morrisson (2011).
The difference in magnitude between number of projects and total amount
is small. As previously mentioned, the value of the average project is about
$3 million. It would therefore seem that adding an extra project in a dis-
trict would benefit more the incumbent than an increase of $3 million in
an already established project. Again, since the IV estimates are biased in
finite sample, this difference only suggests that there could be an advantage
to spread out money in many projects instead of concentrating it in a few
expensive projects, but more research needs to be done.
As for the other variables, conservative candidates benefited from a net
advantage for reelection. This finding is not surprising considering the gain
of popularity of the party across Canada. Members of the Privy council and
MPs running again tend to be reelected with a greater probability. In both
cases, these candidates are better known and therefore have an advantage
against challengers. The margin between the runner-up and the elected can-
didate has a positive but small impact on reelection.
(Table 9 here)
As a final robustness check 6, I also perform a regression explaining the
difference between the share of the vote of the winner of the 2008 elections
in the 2011 and 2008 elections. If this difference is positive, the incumbent
increased his/her popularity from 2008 to 2011. Using a similar model as
the one explaining the reelection probability, I find that the number and
the total value of projects have a significant positive impact on the share
of the vote of the incumbent. One project would have increased the share
of the vote by 0.15 percentage point. Since the average electoral district
received approximately 50 projects, this impact of these projects would have
been an increase in the share of the vote by 7.5 percentage points for the
2008 incumbent. The results provide stronger evidence that the incumbent
received an electoral benefit from the projects as is assumed in the model.
(Table 10 here)
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of government spending where the incumbent
and not the party in power receives electoral credit and finds empirical sup-
6I thank Matt Webb for this suggestion
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port for it. First, it finds evidence for the core district hypothesis using data
from the projects of the 2009-2011 Canada Economic Action Plan. Second, it
shows that the number and value of projects undertaken within the economic
action plan had a significant impact on the reelection of the incumbent in
the 2011 election. The latter empirical finding suggests that pork barrel may
not affect only benefit the party in power, but also the district incumbent.
This new channel increases the complexity of pork barrel distribution.
Throughout this paper, I consider projects as homogeneous, but this as-
sumption is hardly realistic. Repairs to an aqueduct could be as expensive
as repairs to arenas, but the latter is much more visible. Different kinds of
projects could serve different purposes. Future research will focus on the dif-
ferences between the kinds of projects, their distribution and their differential
impact on voting. These differences in visibility could explain the variety of
empirical results found in the literature. If certain kinds of projects have a
great impact on the electorate, third parties should allocate these resources
and not politicians to reduce pork barrel spending. The approval process
also differs across kinds of project. There is no one person who approved
all projects. Different agencies/departments were responsible for different
kinds of projects, and all their own procedures. In some cases, there was
cooperation with provincial authorities to choose projects; in other cases,
NGOs competed to receive financing. If procedures matter, the distribution
of these projects will depend on the allocation process. Future research will
investigate the numerous processes for different strands of projects and the
outcomes they produced. This future research could lead to an improvement
in the efficiency of project allocation by finding procedures that minimize the
impact of pork barrel spending.
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A Definitions
Diff MP Opp - Cons cand/ Difference between opposition MP and
conservative candidate: share of the vote for the opposition canadidate
who won the election in the district minus the share of the vote for the con-
servative candidate. Always positive. If this number is negative, the variable
equals 0.
Diff MP Cons - Opp cand / Difference between conservative MP
and best opposition candidate: share of the vote for the conservative
candidate who won the election in the district minus the share of the vote
for the opposition candidate who received the most vote. Always positive. If
this number is negative, the variable equals 0.
Difference Cons - Best Opp cand / Difference between conserva-
tive candidate and best opposition candidate: share of the vote for the
conservative candidate who won the election in the district minus the share
of the vote for the opposition candidate who received the most vote.
Northern districts: Labrador, Manicouagan, Abitibi Baie-James Nunavik
Eeyou, Kenora, Timmins James Bay, Churchill, Desnethe Missinippi Churchill
River, Fort McMurray Athabasca, Peace River, Prince George Peace River,
Skeena Bulkley Valley, Yukon, Western Arctic, and Nunavut.
Downtown districts: Quebec, Westmount Ville-Marie, Hamilton Centre,
Ottawa Centre, Toronto Centre, Trinity Spadina, Winnipeg Centre, Calgary
Centre, Edmonton Centre, and Vancouver Centre.
Privy Council: Humber St. Barbe Baie Verte, Cardigan, Charlottetown,
Malpeque, Central Nova, Halifax West, Kings Hants, Sydney Victoria, Beause-
jour, Fredericton, New Brunswick Southwest, Beauce, Bourassa, Jonquiere
Alma, Laurier Sainte-Marie, Louis-St-Laurent, Megantic L’Erable, Mount
Royal, NDG Lachine, Pontiac, Roberval Lac-St-Jean, Saint-Laurent Cartierville,
Beaches East York, Bramalea Gore Malton, Cambridge, Carleton Missis-
sipi Mills, Durham, Eglington Lawrence, Etobicoke Lakeshore, Haldimand
Norfolk, Halton, Kingston and the Islands, Markham Unionville, Missis-
saugaBrampton South, Mississauga East Cooksville, Niagara Falls, Ottawa
Vanier, Ottawa West Nepean, Parry Sound Muskoka, Pickering Scaborough
East, Richmond Hill, St. Paul’s, Scaborough Agincourt, Scaborough Guild-
wood, Simcoe-Grey, Thornhill, Toronto Centre, Toronto Danforth, Vaughan,
Wellington Halton Hills, Whitby Oshawa, York Centre, York Simcoe, York
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West, Charleswood St.James Assiniboia, Provencher, Winnipeg South Cen-
tre, Battlefords Lloydminster, Blackstrap, Wascana, Calgary Centre-North,
Calgary Nose-Hill, Calgary Southeast, Calgary Southwest, Edmonton Spruce
Grove, Yellowhead, Chilliwack Fraser Canyon, Esquimalt Juan de Fuca,
Okanagan Coquihalla, Port Moody Westwood Port Coquitlam, Prince George
Peace River, Saanich Gulf Islands, Vancouver Centre, Vancouver South,
Yukon, and Nunavut.
Cabinet: Egmont, Central Nova, Fredericton, Fundy Royal, New Brunswick
Southwest, Jonquiere Alma, Louis-Saint-Laurent, Megantic-L’Erable, Pon-
tiac, Roberval Lac St-Jean, Cambridge, Carleton, Mississipi Mills, Durham,
Haldimand Norfolk, Halton, Niagara Falls, Ottawa West Nepean, Parry
Sound Muskoka, Simcoe Grey, Whitby Oshawa, York Simcoe, Charleswood
St. James Assiniboia, Provencher, Battlefords Lloydminster, Blackstrap,
Calgary Centre North, Calgary Nose Hill, Calgary Southeast, Calgary South-
west, Edmonton Spruce Grove, Yellowhead, Chilliwack Fraser Canyon, Okana-
gan Coquihalla, Port Moody Westwood Port Coquitlam, Prince George Peace
River, Saanich Gulf Islands, Nunavut.
Ottawa districts: Hull Aylmer, Gatineau, Ottawa Centre, Ottawa Orleans,
Ottawa South, Ottawa Vanier, and Ottawa West Nepean.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Timeline of Events
-
T0: Decision Taking T1: First Election T2: Second Election
Project Completion Window
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Difference between the share of votes to the conservative candidate
and the share of votes to the best opposition candidate
Opposition Party Victory Conservative Victory
Swing districts
Cox & McCubbins (1986)
Core District Hypothesis
Lindbeck & Weibull (1987)
Swing District Hypothesis
Pork Barrel
Figure 2:
Empirical Predictions for the Amount of Pork Barrel
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C Tables
Table 1: Transition Probability of Status
District Status (First Election)
CO SO SPP CPP
District Status (Second Election) CO 65 25 10 0
SO 25 35 30 10
SPP 10 30 35 25
CPP 0 10 25 65
Note: All numbers are probabilities.
Definitions: CO: Core Opposition, SO: Swing Opposition, SPP: Swing Party in Power,
and CPP: Core Party in Power.
Table 2: Upper bound of
∂E
∂B
|spp
∂E
∂B
|cpp to ensure a distribution to core districts for
different values of pi
pi Upper Bound
0.1 2.34
0.2 1.87
0.3 1.60
0.4 1.43
0.5 1.30
0.6 1.21
0.7 1.14
0.8 1.08
0.9 1.03
1.0 1
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Table 3: Distribution of Projects per District according to the Results of the
2008 Elections
Average
Number of
Projects
Total Federal
Investment
(million $)
Total
Value
(million $)
Number of
Districts
Core Party in Power 56.5 56.7 149 103
Swing Party in Power 47.5 48.7 111 43
Swing Opposition 43 53 139 52
Core Opposition 43.9 57 135 109
Note: Core Party in Power districts are those where the candidate from the Conservative
Party of Canada (CPC) won by more than 15% of votes. Swing Party in Power districts
are those where the candidate from CPC won by fewer than 15% of votes. The CPC
candidate lost in opposition districts by less than 15% (swing opposition) or by more
than 15% (core opposition). There are 308 electoral districts in Canada, but the CPC
party did not present a candidate in the district of Port-Neuf-Jacques-Cartier in the 2008
election. For this reason, the sum of districts is 307.
Table 4: Socio-Economic Description of Districts
Conservative Opposition Significant Difference
in Means (5%)
Population 105,060 100,568 No
Share under 19 (%) 25.8 23.2 Yes
Share over 65 (%) 13.8 13.9 No
Median Income ($) 67,670 60,900 Yes
Immigrant (%) 14.0 21.2 Yes
Aboriginal (%) 5.8 3.6 Yes
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.8 8.1 Yes
Downtown (%) 1.4 4.8 No
North (%) 4.2 4.8 No
National Capital Region (%) 1.4 3 No
Number of Districts 142 166
Note: The variables are described in more details in the appendix.
30
Table 5: Socio-Economic Description of Downtown Districts
Non-Downtown Downtown Significant Difference
in Means (5%)
Population 102,363 110,869 No
Share under 19 (%) 24.7 16.0 Yes
Share over 65 (%) 13.8 13.6 No
Median Income ($) 64,070 62,565 No
Immigrant (%) 17.6 28.0 Yes
Aboriginal (%) 4.7 3.6 No
Unemployment Rate (%) 7.0 6.7 No
Number of Districts 298 10
Note: The variables are described in more details in the appendix.
Table 6: Previous Employment of Downtown Incumbents in 2011 Elections
District Party Name Life before federal politics
Quebec BQ C. Gagnon real estate agent
Westmount-Ville-Marie Lib. M. Garneau military, astronaut
Ottawa Centre NDP P. Dewar teacher, union activist
Toronto Centre Lib B. Rae Ontario premier
Trinity Spadina NDP O. Chow municipal politician
Hamilton Centre NDP D. Christopherson Union activist
Winnipeg Centre NDP P. Martin Business manager
Calgary Centre CPC L. Richardson Political staff
Edmonton Centre CPC L. Hawn Military
Vancouver Centre Lib H. Fry Medical Doctor
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Table 7: Allocation of Federal Money to Canadian Electoral Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Diff MP Opp - Cons cand -530786.0
(-1.46)
Diff MP Cons - Opp cand 260696.8
(1.40)
Conservative 2008 15379764.9 14311302.5∗
(1.95) (2.05)
Diff Cons - Best Opp cand 364120.6∗ 298561.6∗
(2.42) (2.25)
Privy Council -13993642.3 -12665829.7 -13533706.8
(-1.85) (-1.72) (-1.84)
MP less than 5 years 1552446.8 2261979.2 2775101.1
(0.19) (0.33) (0.40)
MP more than 10 years 4527982.6 3344735.8 3820685.1
(0.51) (0.37) (0.42)
Total population 270.4 267.0 263.8
(1.90) (1.86) (1.85)
Share below 19 -422086089.0∗ -393948528.8∗ -420169438.9∗ -311250665.7∗∗ -333904765.5∗∗
(-2.30) (-2.20) (-2.30) (-3.15) (-3.17)
Share above 65 -104346933.2 -76191796.8 -89784836.2
(-0.75) (-0.55) (-0.66)
Median income -51.28 26.71 -11.91
(-0.17) (0.09) (-0.04)
Share immigrant -12732885.2 -12913268.1 -10080145.4
(-0.44) (-0.44) (-0.34)
Share aboriginal 29976526.6 37365345.3 33788890.7
(0.69) (0.81) (0.76)
Unemployment rate 136446715.8 76287842.2 132435259.7
(1.76) (1.05) (1.74)
Downtown 167353242.9∗∗∗ 168399545.6∗∗∗ 167068846.8∗∗∗ 178592420.0∗∗∗ 177367505.2∗∗∗
(3.49) (3.47) (3.48) (3.54) (3.56)
North 98879857.9∗∗∗ 97395377.1∗∗∗ 98133575.9∗∗∗ 104444834.2∗∗∗ 106373469.6∗∗∗
(5.78) (5.43) (5.71) (6.92) (7.08)
Ottawa 14503623.9 13066180.8 15166095.3
(0.92) (0.81) (0.97)
Constant 133599904.8 112116957.6 125179029.7 113935317.6∗∗∗ 125487882.4∗∗∗
(1.87) (1.73) (1.89) (4.85) (4.84)
R2 0.395 0.388 0.395 0.373 0.378
N 307 308 307 308 307
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: all standard errors are robust. The variables are defined in the appendix.
32
Table 8: Allocation of Projects to Canadian Electoral Districts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Diff MP Opp - Cons cand -0.516∗∗∗
(-3.86)
Diff MP Cons - Opp cand 0.339∗∗∗
(3.70)
Conservative 2008 10.89∗∗ -1.124 -0.747
(2.88) (-0.23) (-0.16)
Diff Cons - Best Opp cand 0.297∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(3.59) (3.84)
Privy Council 1.805 3.138 2.701 1.920
(0.47) (0.83) (0.68) (0.50)
MP less than 5 years -4.884 -0.995 -3.110 -2.839
(-1.61) (-0.35) (-1.02) (-0.95)
MP more than 10 years 6.875 4.656 5.243 5.610
(1.74) (1.14) (1.30) (1.40)
Total population 0.00000970 -0.0000142 -0.0000124 -0.0000156
(0.09) (-0.13) (-0.11) (-0.14)
Share below 19 12.22 14.62 16.47 -7.195
(0.21) (0.25) (0.27) (-0.12)
Share above 65 189.9∗∗ 232.0∗∗∗ 211.2∗∗∗ 198.8∗∗∗ 176.0∗∗∗
(3.20) (4.17) (3.48) (3.42) (4.30)
Median income 0.000107 0.000226 0.000183 0.000149
(0.63) (1.35) (1.04) (0.88)
Share immigrant -58.12∗∗∗ -49.43∗∗∗ -52.85∗∗∗ -49.99∗∗∗ -50.87∗∗∗
(-6.89) (-5.60) (-5.98) (-5.84) (-7.49)
Share aboriginal 49.09 60.08 55.06 52.06
(1.24) (1.60) (1.38) (1.39)
Unemployment rate 259.4∗∗∗ 249.1∗∗∗ 228.5∗∗∗ 276.8∗∗∗ 280.5∗∗∗
(4.77) (4.64) (4.12) (5.24) (5.51)
Downtown 48.91∗∗∗ 47.81∗∗∗ 48.38∗∗∗ 47.20∗∗∗ 50.82∗∗∗
(4.47) (4.62) (4.47) (4.45) (4.92)
North 27.59∗ 25.48∗ 26.74∗ 27.48∗ 42.16∗∗∗
(2.32) (2.17) (2.18) (2.41) (4.22)
Ottawa 14.16 16.38 14.79 16.66
(1.30) (1.55) (1.30) (1.55)
Constant 3.819 -20.82 -13.22 -2.076 9.532
(0.13) (-0.78) (-0.45) (-0.07) (1.40)
R2 0.459 0.453 0.444 0.467 0.439
N 308 307 308 307 307
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note:All standard errors are robust. The variables are defined in the appendix.
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Table 9: Reelection of District Incumbent Party in the 2011 Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probit IV Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit IV Probit
Number Project 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗
(3.86) (4.26) (4.73)
Value Projects (10mio) 0.0190∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗ 0.0364∗∗∗
(3.10) (3.33) (3.37)
Conservative 2008 1.746∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗ 1.310∗∗ 1.782∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗ 1.635∗∗∗
(7.66) (3.08) (3.12) (8.05) (6.00) (6.21)
Change Party 06-08 0.609∗ 0.304 0.303 0.768∗∗ 0.760∗∗ 0.787∗∗
(2.09) (0.93) (1.04) (2.65) (2.71) (2.94)
Victory Margin 08 0.0173∗ 0.0111 0.00791 0.0218∗∗ 0.0200∗∗ 0.0192∗∗
(2.31) (1.41) (1.07) (2.91) (2.73) (2.81)
MP Ran 0.532 0.573 0.662∗ 0.697∗ 0.704∗
(1.64) (1.96) (1.97) (2.17) (2.26)
MP less 5 years 0.138 0.195 0.102 0.0741
(0.58) (0.90) (0.43) (0.33)
MP more than 10 years 0.0744 0.0409 0.0879 0.0152
(0.29) (0.17) (0.34) (0.06)
Privy Council 0.373 0.322 0.484∗ 0.557∗ 0.542∗
(1.57) (1.46) (2.04) (2.44) (2.57)
[1em] Constant -1.823∗∗∗ -2.356∗∗∗ -1.655∗∗∗ -1.783∗∗∗ -1.973∗∗∗ -1.935∗∗∗
(-4.54) (-6.40) (-8.05) (-4.23) (-4.88) (-5.14)
R2 0.38 0.37
N 308 308 308 308 308 308
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: In column 1, the number of project is used to explain the re-election of the district incumbent
party in a probit regression. In columns 2 and 3, whether the district was downtown or not was used as
instrument for the number of projects. Even though, the coefficient from the IV regression is twice the
one from the probit regression, the Wald test cannot reject exogeneity at the 5% level. In column 4, the
value of projects (10 mio) is used in a probit regression to explain the dependent variable. In columns
5-6, the fact that the district or not was downtown is used as instrument for the value of projects. Even
though, the coefficient from the IV regression is twice the one from the probit regression, the Wald test
cannot reject exogeneity at the 5% level.
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Table 10: Changes in the Share of the Vote for the 2008 Winner Between
2011 and 2008 Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Project 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.150∗
(3.82) (2.65) (2.36)
Value Projects (10mio) 0.0650∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(2.07) (2.77) (2.76)
Conservative 2008 11.00∗∗∗ 10.08∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 11.40∗∗∗ 11.28∗∗∗ 11.59∗∗∗
(11.61) (8.73) (9.90) (11.76) (11.40) (12.22)
Change Party 06-08 4.194∗∗ 3.243∗ 4.887∗∗ 5.211∗∗∗ 5.537∗∗∗
(2.62) (2.03) (3.06) (3.58) (4.07)
Victory Margin 08 -0.100∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.0910∗∗ -0.0916∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(-3.42) (-3.39) (-5.26) (-3.05) (-2.87) (-3.30)
MP Ran 5.144∗∗ 5.743∗∗ 6.763∗∗∗ 5.245∗∗ 5.906∗∗∗ 6.022∗∗∗
(2.80) (3.15) (3.99) (2.99) (3.36) (3.73)
MP less 5 years 1.413 1.819 1.031 0.751
(1.29) (1.47) (0.93) (0.64)
MP more than 10 years -0.187 -0.208 -0.502 -1.029
(-0.15) (-0.14) (-0.38) (-0.73)
Privy Council -0.124 0.176 0.0286 0.525
(-0.12) (0.14) (0.03) (0.43)
Constant -14.55∗∗∗ -19.52∗∗∗ -18.09∗∗∗ -13.18∗∗∗ -15.11∗∗∗ -14.85∗∗∗
(-6.97) (-5.85) (-5.22) (-7.36) (-7.49) (-7.48)
N 307 307 307 307 307 307
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: These models explain the difference between the share of votes received by the candidate who
won the 2008 election in the 2011 and 2008 elections. If, for example, the winner of the 2008 elections
received 40 % of the vote in 2008 and 50% of the vote in 2011, the value of the variable is 10% for
this electoral district. In column 1, the number of project is used to explain this difference in a OLS
regression. In columns 2 and 3, whether the district was downtown or not was used as instrument for the
number of projects. In column 4, the value of projects (10 mio) is used in an OLS regression to explain
the difference in the shares of votes. In columns 5-6, the fact that the district or not was downtown is
used as instrument for the value of projects (10mio).
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